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SUBJECT: GEORGIA: EUSR PIERRE MOREL BRIEFS USUN ON GENEVA  
TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. EUSR for Georgia Pierre Morel told Ambassador DiCarlo on April 3 he thought the UN needed a "substantial" mandate in Abkhazia, with symmetrical security zones on both sides of the administrative boundary of Abkhazia. Morel thought Georgia SRSG Verbeke would complete his report by April 20 and that it would be issued in New York on May 7, with another Geneva round likely to be scheduled for May 18. EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby said he thought the EU Monitoring Mission would also be part of a resolution and that the EUMM scope could be expanded beyond its core activity of monitoring the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire agreements. Ambassador DiCarlo raised the possibility that the U.S. might favor a UN report that would avoid outlining specifics of a security regime in order to avoid a contentious negotiation in the Council over details. EU Council Permrep Pedro Serrano thought that such an approach should be considered, but that a negotiation with Russia over a security regime was unavoidable. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Crisis in Georgia Pierre Morel, EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby, and EU Council Permrep Pedro Serrano met with Ambassador DiCarlo on April 3 to discuss plans for a new UN mandate in Georgia and to brief her on the Geneva talks. Morel said he thought a substantial security regime was necessary for a UN mandate, including symmetrical security zones on both sides of the administrative boundary with Abkhazia. The UN mission would also have to be status-neutral, he said. Semneby said he hoped the next UN resolution would also include an explicit reference to the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), and believed the operative references to the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire agreements in Resolution 1866 paved the way for such a reference.

¶3. (C) Morel said he understood that Georgia SRSG Johan Verbeke planned to submit his draft recommendations for a future UN presence to New York by April 20, and that the report would be published by May 7. After recent meetings in Moscow with DFM Karasin, Morel thought Russia would agree to another round of Geneva talks in late May, but would not allow a meeting to be held before the UN report had been issued. (Morel mentioned May 18 as a possible date.) He said the next Geneva round would include a discussion of a new security regime for both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Morel said he also wanted to adhere to the "bottom-up" strategy for the Geneva talks that focused on discussing confidence building measures (CBMs) such as the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. He planned to address additional CBMs, including the normalization of crossing points, at the next session.

¶4. (C) Semneby said he thought the EUMM should expand the scope of its activities in Georgia, although observation of the August 12 and September 8 agreements would continue to be its core activity. Semneby emphasized what he saw as a need for the EUMM to "neutralize" the fact that the EU is not

status neutral. He said the EU would need to maintain its policy of non-recognition of the separatist entities, but at the same time find opportunities for limited engagement with them.

15. (C) Ambassador DiCarlo described preliminary USG thinking in response to a Non-Paper that had been circulated by the UN Secretariat on a future security regime and UN presence. One area being discussed was how to tactically approach achieving a new mandate, she said. One tactical option being considered would be to recommend to the UN that it not include specifics of the security regime in the May 15 SYG's report. Instead, the SYG would outline the necessary elements of the UN mandate, leaving the finalization of specifics to later discussions between the UN and the parties. EU Permrep Serrano said he thought this "theoretical" approach might help to avoid negotiations over the content of the SYG's report such as had occurred with Russia over the November 2008 UNMIK report. He acknowledged, however, that negotiation over the regime would take place in any case, and he wondered if it would be possible to change course after so much detailed discussion on the security regime had already taken place with Russia.

16. (C) DiCarlo also noted the various non-papers floating around (U.K., France, Georgia, UN), and said she thought it important for the Western allies to be clear about what we wanted to achieve and to begin to work off of the same paper to avoid confusion. Semneby agreed that we need to be clear among the Western Allies about what are our main interests: if we want a solid security regime, he said, then we would have to concentrate efforts on achieving one. Morel agreed

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that the "concentration of political will should be strong" in order to achieve a substantial regime. He commented that Russia had successfully blocked progress in Vienna on any elements of the OSCE presence that it did not like, though he thought it would be harder for Russia to block progress in New York. He noted, however, that both China and Turkey had already raised the possibility of another technical rollover.

He added that some in the EU were worried that Georgia would be used as a bargaining chip in efforts by the U.S. and Russia to "reset" relations, which he suggested could impact the ability to achieve a substantial mandate.

Rice